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Abstract 
To have better understanding of compliance behavior of individual taxpayers in developing 
countries especially Nigeria, this study is undertaken primarily to test relationship between tax-
payers’ perception about public governance quality and their compliance behavior as well as to 
determine whether the relationship is moderated by financial condition and risk preference indi-
vidually and jointly. This study involved a survey of individual taxpayers’ opinion, perception 
and behavior about public governance quality as well as tax compliance. The major finding of 
this study is that public governance quality has significant positive relationship with tax com-
pliance behavior. The study also indicates that risk preference has strong negative moderating 
effect on the relationship between public governance quality and tax compliance behavior. Ad-
ministration of income tax in Nigeria is characterized by low compliance level and therefore, 
there is no doubt that improvement in public governance quality would contribute significantly 
in reawakening the culture of tax compliance among individual taxpayers in Nigeria. Empiri-
cally, nothing much is known in tax compliance literature about the influence of public govern-
ance quality on tax compliance behavior of individual taxpayers as well as the moderating ef-
fect of financial condition and risk preference on tax compliance and its determinants. This 
study extended tax compliance model to incorporate public governance quality and moderating 
effects of financial condition and risk preference. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial resources with which govern-
ment discharges its numerous responsi-
bilities come in form of tax revenue and 
non- tax revenue. Alabede (2001) and 
Olaofe (2008) identified tax as the prin-
cipal source of revenue to government in 
some countries1. Eshag (1983) however 
argued that the amount of tax revenue 
generated by government for its expen-
diture program depends among other 
things, on the willingness of the taxpay-
ers to comply with tax laws of a country. 
It is well accepted that some people do 
not like paying taxes and because of this 
reason, it is difficult for tax authorities to 
impose and collect taxes anywhere and 
time (Alm, Martinez- Vazquez and 
Schneider, 2003). The failure to oblige 
to tax provisions suggests that a taxpayer 
may be committing an act of noncompli-
ance (Kirchler, 2007).  Franzoni (2000) 
stated that tax noncompliance is most 
common and critical of all problems of 
tax administration. 
 
Tax noncompliance is a universal phe-
nomenon present in both developing and 
developed countries (Chau & Leung, 
2009; Goradichenko, Martinez-
Vanzquez & Peter, 2009; McGee, 2006 
and Tanzi & Shome, 1993). In develop-
ing countries, tax revenue loss as a result 
of noncompliance is proportionally 
greater than the amount in developed 
countries because   the presence of large 
informal economy that is the hard- to- 
tax sector, (Terkper, 2003). The avail-
able statistic put the average tax revenue 
loss in developing countries to as much 
as between 35% and 55% of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002, 
(Terkper, 2003). These estimates slightly 
increased between 14% and 27% over 
the estimates of between 30% and 40% 
of GDP in 1993, (Feige, 1998 and Plyle, 
1998). Cobham (2005) estimated that 
developing countries lose US$ 285 bil-
lion per year as tax revenue due to tax 
noncompliance. 
 
However, over the past few decades, a 
growing amount of attention has been 
focused on the issue of tax compliance 
problem in the world especially in the 
developed countries. These general con-
cerns have resulted to numerous empiri-
cal studies into the phenomenon. Most 
of the research studies have viewed the 
problem from the theoretical perspective 
of economic deterrence models, (Riahi-
Belkaou, 2004). The classical theory of 
tax compliance otherwise known as A-S 
models developed by Allingham and 
Sandmo in 1972 was based on Becker’s 
(1968) deterrence theory. The theory 
assumes taxpayer maximizes the ex-
pected utilities of the tax evasion gam-
ble, balancing the benefits of successful 
cheating against the risky prospect of 
detection and punishment, (Sandmo, 
2005). The general conclusion of this 
theory is that compliance depends 
largely on tax audit and penalty. The 
implication of the theory is that taxpay-
ers will pay taxes only because of the 
fear of sanction therefore more taxes 
will be paid with increase in fine or audit 
rate. 
 
But the deterrence approach as the meas-
ure to fight noncompliance has been 
contested in economic analysis. Empiri-
cal evidences are abundant to prove that 
deterrence may not entirely be depended 
upon to understand the phenomenon of 
tax noncompliance. For instance, Feld 
and Frey (2003), Slemrod (2009), Tor-
1 Income tax was 60.3% and58.7% of total tax of the 
central government of Malaysia and Indonesia respec-
tively in 2004, (Bird & Zolt,2005).  
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gler (2003) and Torgler and Schaffner 
(2007) have all reported that fines and 
tax audit are unable to account for the 
actual level of tax compliance in some 
countries.  Deterrence theory is based on 
economic analysis and ignores com-
pletely social and psychological perspec-
tive of noncompliance. However, Jack-
son and Millron (1986) and Alm (1999) 
stated that tax noncompliance decision 
may be affected by factors not consid-
ered in the basic model and that other 
factors may well be relevant in explain-
ing tax noncompliance behavior. As a 
result, some researchers had expanded 
the model. But despite the various ex-
pansions, literature has nothing much to 
show on the influence of perception of 
taxpayers about public governance qual-
ity as well as moderating effect of per-
sonal financial condition and risk prefer-
ence on tax compliance behavior. But 
the relevance of these factors in under-
standing tax compliance behavior par-
ticularly in developing countries and 
Nigeria especially cannot be underesti-
mated (Bird,&Zolt, 2005 ; Everst-Philip 
& Sandall,2009; Odinkonigbo,2009; 
Torgler, 2007). This study is undertaken 
primarily to test the relationship tax-
payer’s perception about public govern-
ance quality and his/her tax compliance 
behavior and to determine whether the 
relationship is moderated by taxpayer’s 
financial condition and risk preference. 
To achieve these objectives, this paper is 
organized into five major parts. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
Tax Compliance Behavior in Nigeria 
Today, in Nigeria as the case with some 
developing countries, administration of 
income tax is characterized by low com-
pliance level. Despite Nigeria’s human 
and natural endowment as well as eco-
nomic potentiality, the country has con-
tinued to record one of the lowest tax 
compliance rates in Africa, (CITN, 
2010). Even with all efforts through the 
various tax reforms2 undertaken by Ni-
gerian government to increase tax reve-
nue over the years, statistical evidences 
have proved that the contribution of in-
come taxes to the government’s total 
revenue remained consistently low and 
is shrinking. However, of all the taxes, 
personal income tax has remained the 
most disappointing, nonperforming, un-
satisfactory and problematic in Nigerian 
tax system, (Asabe, 2005; Kiabel & 
Nwokah, 2009; Nzotta, 2007; Odusola, 
2006; Sani, 2005). The statistical data 
indicated that contributions of non oil 
income tax to total revenue of Govern-
ment in Nigeria dropped from 19.8% in 
1999 to 11.7% in 2008 and the tax ratio 
in 2009 was 11% the lowest in West 
Africa and below 15% recommended for 
low income countries, (CBN,2008; Cob-
ham,2005;  ITN,2010). Specifically, the 
contribution of individual income tax 
remained marginal and comparatively 
low in Nigeria’s tax revenue. At the state 
and local government levels, where the 
major source of internal revenue is ex-
pected to be individual income tax, its 
contribution to the total revenue of these 
levels dropped from20.18 and7.7% in 
1999 to 12.4 and 1.6% in 2008 respec-
tively (CBN, 2008) .  Although the low 
and the shrinking tax compliance level 
in Nigeria might be caused by multitude 
of factors, but the relevance of public 
governance quality cannot be underesti-
mated,( Akpo,2009; Bird,& Zolt, 2005; 
2 Some tax reforms in Nigeria include Structural Adjust-
ment Program in 1986,Shehu’s Task Force on Tax , 
1978; Dr Sylvester’s Study Group on Tax , 1999; Eco-
nomic Empowering Development Strategies,  2002  
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Everst-Philip & Sandall,2009; Odin-
konigbo,2009; Oluba,2008).  
 
 
Public Governance Quality and Tax 
Compliance
Public governance quality is an issue of 
general concern to citizens of nations as 
it bothers directly on benefits derivable 
from governance. World Bank (2006) 
views public governance quality as the 
process in which leaders in authority are 
selected, monitored and replaced to-
gether with the capacity of the govern-
ment of a country to manage the re-
sources of a country effectively and im-
plement sound policies for benefits of 
everyone as well as the respect of the 
citizens and the government for the insti-
tutions that regulate economic and social 
interaction in the country.  Rotberg 
(2005) also described public governance 
as the management, supply and delivery 
of political goods to the citizens of a 
country. To Besancon (2003) public 
governance exists to deliver political 
goods to the citizens and further stated 
that quality public governance is as-
sumed when a country provides high 
order of certain political goods.  
 
However, what is the connection be-
tween public governance quality and tax 
compliance behavior. Citizens support 
government in its responsibilities 
through the provision of finance in form 
of tax payment. What is happening in 
government therefore, should matter to 
the taxpayers because they provide the 
finance for its sustenance. In analyzing 
the relationship between taxpayers and 
government, Levi (1988) stated the tax 
compliance is influenced by vertical 
contract. He said that the contract be-
tween taxpayers and government is ver-
tical contract which he refers to as quid 
pro quo of taxation. Vertical contract is 
concerned with whether taxpayers get 
public goods in exchange for taxes paid. 
According to the argument of quid pro 
quo, complying with tax law provision 
depends in part on whether the political 
goods provided by the government are 
sufficient in return to the taxes they are 
paying (Lassen,2003). Levi (1988) ar-
gued that if it is perceived by the taxpay-
ers that the rate of transformation from 
tax to political goods is low then the tax-
payers will feel that the government has 
not kept its obligation of the contract, as 
a result, voluntary tax compliance will 
deteriorate. In support of Levi (1988), 
Besancon (2003) also stated that there is 
social contract between government 
(ruler) and taxpayers (ruled) which em-
bodied effective delivery of political 
goods.  
 
In addition, in line with earlier submis-
sion of Alm, McClelland and Schulze 
(1992), Lassen (2003) said that the po-
litical goods mix is also important and 
declared that if the political goods mix 
supplied by the government is very dif-
ferent from those the taxpayers prefer or 
rate of transformation is low due to cor-
ruption, taxpayers may feel the attrac-
tiveness of the quid pro quo contract 
diminished and that could lead to lower 
tax compliance.  Arguing in the same 
vein, Torgler (2003) said that when pub-
lic governance quality is down, individu-
als’ tax compliance may be crowded out 
since government fails to honor his hon-
esty. Examining the relationship be-
tween public governance quality and 
compliance further, Everst-Philips and 
Sandall (2009) noted that there is link-
age between public governance quality 
and taxation and that quality governance 
deliver good tax system and equally bet-
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ter tax system make it possible to have 
good governance. Akpo (2009) equally 
stated that good governance entails the 
provision of quality public goods to the 
public and that where government fails 
to provide public amenities and infra-
structure to the citizen in exchange for 
tax payment, citizen may become reluc-
tant to pay tax.  Alm, et al (1992) also 
submitted that compliance occurs be-
cause people  appreciate the political 
goods that their tax payments finance 
and that if there is increase in the 
amount and quality of the political goods 
going to them from tax payment, their 
compliance rates may likely increase.  
Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, (2007) 
stated that indicators of public govern-
ance quality include government effec-
tiveness in provision of quality of public 
goods, participation in governance 
through democracy and accountability, 
political stability, adherence to rule of 
law and control of corruption. Wall-
shutzky (1985) revealed that substantial 
number of respondents made compliance 
decision in relation to the level of public 
service provided by the government.  
Alm, et al (1992) also reported that aver-
age compliance is always higher in the 
presence of the public goods. The same 
result was found in Alm and Gomez 
(2008). Torgler (2003) also pointed out 
that the more the opportunity of partici-
pation in political decision making by 
taxpayers through democratic means, the 
more relationship between government 
and taxpayers will be based on trust and 
this will have influence on the willing-
ness of individual to pay tax.  In tax mo-
rale study,  Alm, and Torgler (2006) 
showed that US has high tax morale than 
Austria and Switzerland as a result of its 
strong direct democratic value. 
 
In their contribution, Joshua and Jinjarik 
(2005) theorized that greater polarization 
and political instability in a country 
would reduce the efficiency of tax col-
lection hence lower compliance level. 
Damania, Fredriksson and Mani (2004) 
reported that in political stable country, 
there is high degree of compliance with 
regulation. The same result was obtained 
in Tedds (2007). Torgler and Schneider 
(2009) also noted that lack of efficient 
and effective administration of rule of 
laws may undermine the willingness of 
the citizens to pay tax.  Bergman (2009) 
revealed that country which has estab-
lished rule of laws and that become 
widely accepted as well as embraced as 
social norm of its people have better 
compliance than a country without effi-
cient rule of laws. Furthermore, Torgler 
(2003) argued that combating corruption 
can help control the problem of tax non-
compliance. Uslaner’s (2007) study indi-
cated that less corruption will lead to 
greater tax compliance. 
 
 
Financial Condition as a Moderator 
for Public Governance Quality and 
Tax Compliance 
The inconsistency of findings on the 
relationship between tax compliance and 
some of its determinants most especially 
the deterrents factors (Dubin, Grazte 
&Wilde,1987; Dubin & Wilde,1988), 
has encouraged suggestion in the litera-
ture  that the relationship may be moder-
ated by some variables (Kirchler, Muel-
bacher, Kastlunger &Wahl,2007). There 
are indications in other behavioral stud-
ies that financial condition (requirement) 
and family obligations moderate the re-
lationship individuals’ commitment and 
performance (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; 
Brett, Cron & Slocum, 1995). Empiri-
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cally, some behavioral studies have 
shown support for the moderating ef-
fects of financial requirement on indi-
vidual’s behavior ( Doran, Stone, Brief 
& George, 1991; Brett et al 
1995).Specifically, the finding of Brett 
and his colleague (1995)  provides proof 
that when financial condition is moder-
ating individual commitment and per-
formance, the relationship between com-
mitment and performance is high vis-à-
vis. This implies that financial burden 
might moderates individual commitment 
to discharge obligations, including tax 
payment. The implication of moderating 
effect of individual financial condition 
on tax compliance and its determinants 
may be more obvious in the society 
where there is high family responsibility 
and poverty rate as the case in some de-
veloping countries including Nigeria 
(Brett et al 1995). Therefore, financial 
condition of individual may have posi-
tive or negative effect on the relationship 
between his/her perception quality of 
public governance and compliance be-
havior. Torgler (2003) argued that the 
financial situation of the individual may 
cause the taxpayer distress particularly 
when payment is to be made including 
taxes. Equally, Bloomquist (2003) 
shows financial strain as one of the 
sources of taxpayer’s stress. As support, 
the criminal behavior study of Carroll 
(1989) reported that lack of money moti-
vates individual to search for opportu-
nity for engaging in crime. 
 
 
Risk Preference as a Moderator for 
Public Governance Quality and Tax 
Compliance
Risk preference is one characteristic of 
individual that influences his behavior,
(Sitkin and Pablo,1992). In a complete 
conceptualization of risk preference, 
three ranges are possible. These include: 
risk aversion, risk neutrality and risk 
seeking. A number of researchers and 
scholars have suggested that the attitude 
of taxpayer to risk cannot be underesti-
mated in his/her compliance behavior,
(Alm & Torgler,2006; Hite & 
McGill,1992; Torgler, 2003 ).  Torgler 
(2007) submitted that individual taxpay-
Public Governance 
Quality 
Tax Compliance 
Behavior 
 Financial Condition  Risk Preference 
Figure1. The Research Framework of Tax Compliance Behavior 
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ers’ decision could be affected by their 
attitude toward risk. Individual risk pref-
erence is one of the components of sev-
eral theories relating to decision making 
including tax compliance theories like 
expected utility theory, prospect theory 
etc. The theoretical basis for the moder-
ating role of risk preference in the rela-
tionship between tax compliance and 
public governance quality is found in the 
prospect theory. The theory indicated 
that how a situation is framed will deter-
mine the outcome of individual risk 
choice. According to Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), individual tends to be 
inconsistent in their decision making as 
a result of changing situation. Therefore, 
when tax compliance and its determi-
nants are predicted to have strong posi-
tive relationship it may not be so be-
cause of the effect of individual taxpay-
ers’ risk preference which varies accord-
ing to situation and individual to individ-
ual.  
In the light of the relevant literature and 
theoretical support provided in the sec-
tion above, the tax compliance model 
which only incorporate public govern-
ance quality with financial condition and 
risk preference as moderators is set out 
in figure 1 below. 
Based on the theoretical framework 
above, we proposed the following hy-
potheses for validation: 
 
H1: Perception of taxpayer about quality 
of public governance has positive rela-
tionship with his/her compliance behav-
ior. 
 
H2: Taxpayer’s financial condition mod-
erates the relationship between his/ her 
perception about quality of public gov-
ernance and tax compliance behavior. 
 
H3: Taxpayer’s risk preference moder-
ates the relationship between his/ her 
perception about quality of public gov-
ernance and tax compliance behavior. 
 
H4: Financial condition and risk prefer-
ence jointly moderate the relationship 
between taxpayer’s perception about 
quality of public governance and tax 
compliance behavior. 
 
 
3. Research Design and Methodology  
Samples and Demographic Character-
istics of Samples 
The samples of the study were selected 
in two stages. In the first stage, Abuja3 
city was chosen as the geographical of 
the study using cluster sampling tech-
nique. While in the second stage, indi-
vidual taxpayers residing in Abuja4 were 
selected randomly as respondents of the 
study and a total of 550 questionnaires 
were administered to these individuals. 
At the  of the field work, total of 332 of 
usable questionnaires were retrieved 
representing approximately 60% re-
sponse rate or 87% of predetermined 
sample size of 382.   
 The demographic information on the 
respondents as presented in table 1 indi-
cates that about 61% of the respondents 
were male leaving 39% as female and 
that the age grouping of majority of the 
respondents falls between 20 and 40 
years (72.2%). Equally, approximately 
80% of the respondents had higher edu-
cation background either as graduates of 
polytechnic, university or other tertiary 
institutions. On occupation, the table 
reveals that about 58% of the respon-
3 Abuja city is Nigeria capital city and has representa-
tion from every spectrum of Nigeria society. 
4 The samples were selected from list of individual 
taxpayers in Abuja city. 
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  Gender
   Male                                                              204                                                   61.3 
   Female                                                          128                                                   38.6 
Age groups 
  20 – 30 years                                                    75                                                   22.6                                  
  31 – 40 years                                                  148                                                   44.6           
 41 – 50  years                                                     85                                                  25.6              
 Above 50 years                                                  24                                                     7.2          
Education
Primary education                                                 7                                                     2.1
Secondary education                                          58                                                   17.5                 
Higher education                                              267                                                   80.4      
 Occupation 
 Professional                                                     141                                                   42.5                                   
Non Professional                                              191                                                   57.5                                 
Source of income                                                                                                               
Public sector                                                     171                                                   51.5                 
Private sector                                                      81                                                   24.4                   
Sole proprietor                                                    80                                                   24.1                                        
 Income Level 
Low income                                                      218                                                   65.7 
Middle income                                                    83                                                   25.0                                    
High income                                                        31                                                     9.3 
Race                                                     
  Hausa                                                              113                                                   34.0                                        
 Yoruba                                                               72                                                   21.7                                        
 Igbo                                                                    61                                                   18.4                                        
Minority                                                              86                                                   25.9                                        
Religion 
 Islam                                                                  96                                                    28.9                                       
Christian                                                           225                                                    67.8                                       
Traditional religion                                            11                                                       3.3 
Category                                                    Frequency                                          Percentage 
                                                                     (N=332)                                            (Total=100) 
Table 1 
 Demographic Information of the Taxpayers 
dents were nonprofessional leaving 42% 
of the respondents as professional The 
source of income for a little more than 
half of the respondents was the public 
sector and also the average monthly in-
come of about 66% of the respondents 
was from less than NGN 50,000 to not 
more than NGN 99,999. Table 1 equally 
reveals that all the ethnic and religious 
groups in Nigeria were represented in 
the study but Hausa (34%) and Christian 
(67.8%) were more prominence in the 
study. 
 
Generally, the composition of the re-
spondents to greater extent fairly re-
flected the characteristic of population 
distribution of Nigeria (National Bureau 
of Statistic, 2009). 
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Operational Definitions and Measure-
ments
Public Governance Quality  
Public governance quality is a multi fac-
eted concept which encompasses all as-
pects of exercising authority through 
formal and informal institutions in the 
management of the available resources 
of a state for the benefit of the people 
(Huther and Shah, 1999). In the context 
of this study, public governance quality 
is defined as provision of political goods 
of necessary quality by government to 
the taxpayers efficiently (Rotberg, 
2005).  Kaufmann et al (2007) Torgler et 
al (2007), Torgler and Schneidler (2009) 
indicated that public governance quality 
is multidimensional construct with five 
indicators. Following after Marc (2001) 
and Afrobarometer (2006), the percep-
tion of taxpayer on public governance 
quality was measured by 17 items which 
cut across the five dimensions 
(democracy & accountability, political 
Stability, government effectiveness, rule 
of law and control of corruption) using 5 
point agreed/disagree likert- scale . 
Financial Condition 
 
Personal financial condition is a moder-
ating variable and it is defined as the 
extent to which the taxpayer is satisfy 
with his financial condition and that of 
his/her household ( Lago-Penas & Lago-
Penas, 2009; Torgler,2003). It was 
measured categorically using options of 
“dissatisfy” and “satisfy” as was done in 
(Torgler, 2007) and was re-coded into 
dichotomous values of (0) and (1) re-
spectively. 
Risk Preference  
Taxpayer’s risk preference is a moderat-
ing variable and it is operationally de-
fined as risk- laden opportunities which 
a taxpayer considers are more desirable 
than other possible available choices
(Atkins, Goldfarb, Kerps, Rogers, 
Schoolman & vanOpdrop 2005; 
Guthrine,2003). The study measured the 
general preference of taxpayer in taking 
financial risk, social risk, health risk, 
career risk and safety risk using five 
items on 5 point agreed/disagree likert- 
scale as provided in Nicholson, Soane, 
Fenton-O’Creevy & William, (2005) 
Tax Compliance Behavior 
 
Also in the context of this study, tax 
compliance is operationally considered 
as complying with tax laws involving 
true reporting of the tax base; correct 
computation of the tax liabilities; timely 
filling of tax returns and timely payment 
of the amount due as tax (Chatopadhyay 
& DasGupta 2002; Franzoni,2000). Any 
behavior by the taxpayer contrarily to 
the above is noncompliance. Tax com-
pliance behavior was measured with 
four items covering the four components 
of tax compliance using hypothetical 
scenario case as was done in Bobek, 
(1997), and Chan, Troutman & O’Bryan, 
(2000). Respondents were asked to indi-
cate (1) the Naira amount of income and 
deduction they would report on their tax 
return if they were in similar situation as 
in scenario case (2) the date they would 
file their income tax returns if they were 
in similar situation as in scenario case 
(3) many days after receiving assess-
ment notice would it take them to pay 
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their income tax if they were in similar 
situation as in scenario case.  The scores 
of (1), (2) and (3) was assigned to the 
options under each items of the scenario 
case and the values are interpreted as 
somewhat compliance, moderately com-
pliance and full compliance.    
4. Results and Discussion 
Factor Analysis 
 
In order to check the construct validity 
of the research instrument, the items of 
metric latent variables submitted to fac-
tor-analysis using principal component 
analysis with varimax rotation.  
 
Public Governance Quality 
 
The values of Bartllet’s Test of Spheric-
ity (.000) and KMO (.879) suggest that 
the data on Public Governance Quality 
are suitable for factor analysis. The 
analysis carried out using varimax fi-
nally yielded four factors  and these fac-
tors account for about 84% of the vari-
ance with the lowest and highest factor 
loading as .761  and  .923 respectively. 
Furthermore, the lowest communality 
and anti-image correlation coefficient 
are .588 and .641 respectively. All in all, 
the result suggests that the criteria are 
met therefore construct validity is as-
sumed for Public Governance Quality 
latent variable. The four factors ex-
Factor1                                                                                                                                                28.26%
Free and fair election in Nigeria                                PGQ2           .905            .949            .875 
Fairness in administration of justice                       PGQ16            .904            .913            .940 
Trust  of  the parliament in making good law           PGQ1            .900            .934           .889 
 Independence of the judiciary                                PGQ15            .891            .912            .917 
Factor2                                                                                                                                                28.05%                     
Diversion of public funds due to corruption           PGQ10            .923           .945            .857 
Trust of financial honesty of politicians                    PGQ9            .912           .952            .857  
Police effectiveness in combating crime                 PGQ17            .894           .905            .934 
Access to govt. annual report and account                PGQ4            .858           .824            .964 
Factor3                                                                                                                                                15.98% 
 Satisfaction with quality of education                      PGQ8            .864           .754            .640 
Satisfaction with quality infrastructure                     PGQ5            .857           .737            .641 
Satisfaction with quality in health service                PGQ7            .761            .588           .759 
Factor4                                                                                                                                                 11.38% 
Decline in  political authority and stability             PGQ12            .875           .772            .708 
Ethnical and religious conflict and stability           PGQ14            .779            .692           .847  
KMO: .879                                                                                             Total Variance Explained : 83.67%
Note: 1. Load= Factor loading, Communal= Communality, Anti-image=Anti-image correlation
           2.Items deleted in course of the analysis include PGQ3, PGQ 6, PGQ11 and  PGQ13 
Factor                                                                 Code      Load        Communal   Anti-Image    Total  
                                                                                                                                                     Variance
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericty: Sig  000 
Table2
Factor Analysis for Public Governance Quality 
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tracted from the analysis contained indi-
cators or items to represent each of the 
five dimensions of Public Governance 
Quality construct and as a result, the 
combination of these factors would give 
fair representation of Public Governance 
Quality construct. However, this study is 
concerned with Public Governance 
Quality scale as whole not each dimen-
sion of the construct. The reliability test 
on the remaining 13 items gave alpha 
of .877.  
Risk Preference 
The factor analysis on the items of Risk 
Preference yielded one factor and it ac-
counts for about of 73% of the variance 
with eigenvalue of 3.64 (see table 3). 
The five items of the factor loaded at 
value above .80 while the lowest value 
of communality and anti-image correla-
tion coefficient are .667 and .672 respec-
tively. The appropriateness of the data 
on Risk Preference was also assured 
Factor1                                                                                                                          72.89%                            
Financial risk taking                     RP1            .888                . 667             .837     
Social risk     taking                      RP2            .872                .760              .815        
Health risk   taking                      RP3            .870                 .789             .821  
Career risk   taking                      RP4            .820                 .883             .756                      
Safety risk   taking                      RP5            .817                 .886              .672 
Note: 1. Load= Factor loading, Communal= Communality, Anti-image=Anti-image correlation 
KMO : .846                                                                          Total Variance Explained : 72.89%
Bartlett’s Test  of  Sphericity: Sig : 000
Table 3 
 Factor Analysis for Risk Preference 
Factor                              Code           Load             Communal      Anti-Image             Total
                                                                                                                                        Variance

Factor1                                                                                                                                
56.36%                                
Income Reporting                            TCB1            .833                .504            .810     
Tax Deductions Reporting               TCB2            .793                .426            .788        
Return Filing                                    TCB3            .710                 .629            .695  
Tax Payment                                    TCB4            .653                 .694            .681        
Table 4 
 Factor Analysis for Tax Compliance Behavior 
Factor                                Code           Load           Communal      Anti-Image                    Total
                                                                                                                                                 Variance
KMO:  .726                                                                             Total Variance Explained : 56.36% 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericty: Sig  000
Note: 1. Load= Factor loading, Communal= Communality, Anti-image=Anti-image correlation
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with the values of  Bartllet’s Test of 
Sphericity  (.000) and KMO (.846). 
These results of analysis also met the 
criteria of factor analysis and therefore 
provide evidence of construct validity on 
Risk Preference. Furthermore, the reli-
ability test on the 5 items gave cronbach 
alpha .917 
 
 
Tax Compliance Behavior 
With values of  Bartllet’s Test of 
Sphericity  (.000) and KMO (.726), the 
factor analysis of the data collected on 
tax compliance behavior is assumed. 
The analysis yielded one factor which it 
accounts for about of 53% of the vari-
ance with eigenvalue of 2.25. Item 
TCB4 has lowest factor loading of .653 
while the value of communality and anti
-image correlation coefficient are 
above .426 and .681 respectively. These 
results met the minimum criteria of fac-
tor analysis therefore support construct 
validity of tax compliance behavior. In 
addition, the reliability test on the 4 
items gave cronbach alpha .740 
Descriptive Statistics 
Perception about Public Governance 
Quality
The views of the respondents on the 
quality of public governance in Nigeria 
were expressed in items PGQ1 to 
PGQ17 and the result of the descriptive 
analysis of the items are presented in 
table4. Specifically, the result reveals 
that the perception of the respondents 
about the quality of democracy and ac-
countability in Nigeria as indicated in 
item PGQ1, 2&4 was low and this is 
reflected in the weak mean scores of 
1.92, 1.96 and 1.97 respectively. On 
government effectiveness in the provi-
sion of public goods like education, 
health etc, the perception of the respon-
dents expressed in items PGQ5, 7&8 
and majority of the respondents strongly 
disagreed with the statements in these 
items that is 57%, 59% and 58% of the 
respondents respectively. This is indica-
tion that the respondents were of the 
views that government’s effectiveness in 
delivery of public goods was low. Fur-
thermore, the views of the respondents 
regarding corruption as contained in 
item PGQ9&10 indicated that 68% of 
the respondents did not trust the finan-
cial honesty of Nigerian politicians 
while 70% disagreed that there is no di-
version of public fund in Nigeria. The 
mean scores of 2.01 and 1.99 respec-
tively for PGQ9&10 imply that the re-
spondents perceived the control of cor-
ruption in Nigeria to be low. Table 5 
also shows the views of the respondents 
on political stability in Nigeria in items 
PGQ12&14. The mean scores of these 
items which are below 2 suggesting that 
the respondents viewed political stability 
to be low in Nigeria. On the fairness of 
the rule of law, the views of the respon-
dents were expressed in item PGQ15, 
16&17 and all these items have mean 
scores below 2. Majority of the respon-
dents expressed disagreement in the 
statements in each of the three items. On 
the whole, the overall mean score of 
2.01 and standard deviation of .73 on 
public government quality suggested 
that the respondents perceived the qual-
ity of public governance low.
Risk Preference 
The preferences of the respondents to take 
risk were appraised using item RP1to RP5 
and the result of the descriptive statistics on 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Public Governance Quality  
Note:1. M=Mean ,Std D= Standard Deviation, SA= Strongly Agree, SD= Strongly Disagree 2. 
Percentage in parenthesis  
Code                  Items                                              M            Std D       S A/        Neutral         S D/
                                                                                                                Agree                           Disagree

PGQ1.   I trust the National Assembly in making           1.92          1.13       32(10)       55(16)         245(74) 
               good laws for Nigeria.                                 
PGQ2.   There is free and fair election in Nigeria.          1.96          1.11       31(19)        54(16)        247(75)                         
PGQ4.   I have access to the published accounts             1.97          1.18       38(12)        63(19)        231(69) 
               and annual report of Federal Government.    
PGQ5.   I am not satisfied with quality of general          2.45           1.35       76(22)       68(21)        188(57) 
               infrastructure in Nigeria.                          
PGQ7.   I am satisfied with the manner the                     2.31           1.22       60(18)       77(23)        195(59) 
               govt. is handling the health service           
PGQ8.   I am satisfied with the manner the govt. is        2.35           1.32       64(19)       76(23)        192(58) 
               handling the education system. 
PGQ9.   I trust the financial honesty of Nigerian            2.01           1.19       40(12)       66(20)        226(68) 
               politicians.                   
PGQ10. There is no diversion of public funds due         1.99           1.20       40(12)       59(18)        233(70)         
               to corruption  is common in Nigeria     
PGQ12. Political stability is declining in Nigeria           1.97           1.12         31(9)       73(22)        229(69)                         
PGQ14. Ethnic and religious conflict is not a threat       1.67           0.90        13(4)        55(17)       264(80) 
               to  stability in Nigeria                       
PGQ15. Nigeria’s Judiciary is free interference of         1.85           1.07         26(7)       54(17)        252(76) 
               other arms of government               
PGQ16. Justice is fairly administered in Nigeria            1.84           1.08         28(8)       48(15)        256(77)                         
PGQ17. Nigerian police force is effective in                   1.95          1.17       38(12)       58(18)        236(70)  
               combating crime   
               Overall                                                                2.01          0.73 
Indicate the extent to which any of the  
         following have ever applied to you. 
RP1  Health risks ( eg smoking, poor diet,              1.81         1.26         37(11)          44(13)          251(76) 
         high alcohol consumption).                              
RP2  Financial risks (eg gambling,                          1.95         1.36         49(15)          42(13)          241(72) 
         risky investment).                                                             
RP3. Career risks (eg quitting a job                         1.92         1.32         48(15)          47(14)          237(71)                
         without another to go to)                                                
RP4. Safety risks ( eg fast driving, city                   1.96         1.34         52(16)          46(14)          234(70) 
         cycling without a helmet)                                         
RP5. Social risks (eg standing for election,            1.96          1.35         53(16)          48(15)          231(69) 
         publicly challenging a rule)                      
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics for Risk Preference 
Code                  Items                                             M           Std D           S A/          Neutral              S D/
                                                                                                                  Agree                               Disagree
Note:1. M=Mean ,Std D= Standard Deviation, SA= Strongly Agree, SD= Strongly Disagree 2. 
Percentage in parenthesis  
          Overall                                                           1.91          1.12 
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these items (see table6)  indicate that each of 
the items has mean score below 2. On dis-
agreement scale, majority of the respondents 
(76%) did not agreed taking health risk of 
smoking etc (RP1) while at the agreement 
scale, 16% of respondents agreed to have 
engaged in social risk. On the whole, the 
overall mean score of 1.91 and standard de-
viation of 1.12 suggested that the respon-
dents were risk averse. 
Tax Compliance Behavior 
The compliance behavior of the respon-
dents towards tax rule and regulations 
are presented in table 7. The table re-
veals that about 28% of the respondents 
complied with tax rule and regulations in 
declaring their income for tax purpose 
and this leaves about 76% of the respon-
dents as noncompliant. The same result 
as in income reporting compliance was 
obtained on tax claims reporting as only 
minority (22%) of the respondents were 
compliant. This result was expected con-
sidering the close association between 
tax income reporting and claims report-
ing: tax claims normally accompany in-
come reporting. Moreover, the result 
reflected the fact that most of the re-
spondents (52%) derived their income 
from salaries whose tax is withheld at 
point of payment and they did not con-
sider it necessary to report other extract 
source of income for tax. Table 7 also 
indicates that about 48% of the respon-
dents fully complied with tax rules re-
garding return filing while the remaining 
52% of the respondents complied with 
the tax rules regarding to return filing 
either moderately or somewhat as such 
were noncompliant. This result is not 
surprising considering that great number 
of the respondents were salary earners 
and had their taxes deducted at point of 
payment perhaps this might have influ-
enced their behavior . Unexpectedly, the 
analysis on tax payment compliance in-
dicates that about 40% of the respon-
dents fully complied leaving 60% as 
noncompliant. This result may reflect 
the fact that majority of the respondents 
had their income tax deducted through 
Pay As You Earn (PAYE) scheme. 
However, in the overall compliance, 
only about 11% of the respondents com-
plied with income reporting, tax claims 
reporting, return filling and tax payment 
as stipulated by tax rule and regulations; 
therefore leaving majority of the respon-
dents (89%) as noncompliant. The result 
indicates that tax noncompliance is great 

Income Reporting         2.00        0.74                     90(27)                 149(45)                     93(28) 
Tax Claims Reporting 1.86        0.75                     120(36)                 140(42)                     72(22)               
 Return Filing               2.19        0.85                      94(28)                   80(24)                   158(48)               
 Tax Payment               2.16        0.78                      79(24)                120(36)                    133(40) 
Overall                         2.06        0.59                      94(28)                238(61)                      36(11)
Table7
Descriptive statistics for Tax Compliance Behavior  
                                                                                       Noncompliance
Component                    M          SD                    Somewhat           Moderately     Compliance
                                                                                Compliance         Compliance
Note:1) Percentage in parenthesis 2) M= Mean, SD= Standard Deviation 
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problem in Nigeria and this result is 
closed to the estimate of 91% as non-
compliance rate in Nigeria by Asabe 
(2005).  
Moderated Multiple Regression 
 
To test the hypotheses on the direct and 
moderating relationship among public 
governance quality, financial condition, 
risk preference and tax compliance be-
havior, moderated multiple regression 
analysis was used following process rec-
ommended by Darrow& Kahl  (1982) 
and Hair et al (2010) as supported by 
Evans (1987). In this case, tax compli-
ance behavior was regressed on public 
governance quality in the first stage to 
obtain the main effect while in the sec-
ond stage; the dependent variable was 
regressed on independent variable, mod-
erator(s) and the product of the inde-
pendent variable and moderator(s). Be-
fore the multiple regressions, the con-
tinuous variables were centered to re-
duce the effect of multicollinearity as 
suggested by Aiken &West (1991). The 
results of the regressions are presented 
in table 8,9 and10. 
Table 8 
 Result of Multiple Regressions for the Moderating Effect  of Financial  Condition 

  PGQ                                                                                       .326(6.277)*            .432(4.705)*            
  FinCon                                                                                                              -.401(-7.533)* 
  PGQX FinCon                                                                                                      .077(.880)                                 

  Adjusted R2                                                                                                    .238                           .237 
  Change R2                                                                                 .242*                           .002 
   F Value                                                                                    52.558*                        35.273*
 Variable                                                                              Model1              Model2
R2                                                                                                                                         .242                          .244
Note: (1). *p<. .01,** p< .05,*** p< .10  (2) T Statistics in parenthesis. (3) PGQ= Public Gov-
ernance Quality, FinCon= Financial Condition, RP= Risk Preference
PGQ                                                                                          .326(6.277)*                .318(5.963)*            
RP                                                                                                                            .086(1.558) 
PGQ X RP                                                                                                            -.101(-1.864)***                        

 Adjusted R2                                                                                                           .104                          .110 
Change R2                                                                                         .107*                          .009*** 
R2                                                                                                                         .107                             .118
Table 9 
  Result of Multiple Regressions for the Moderating Effect  of  Risk Preference 
Variable                                                                                           Model1              Model3 
Note: (1). *p<. .01,** p< .05,*** p< .10  (2) T Statistics in parenthesis. (3) PGQ= Public Gov-
ernance Quality, FinCon= Financial Condition, RP= Risk Preference
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In table 8, the result of the main effect 
and the moderating effect of Financial 
Condition is presented and in model 1, 
the result indicates that public govern-
ance quality ( = .326; P<.01) is positive 
significantly related to taxpayers’ com-
pliance behavior hence this result sup-
port hypothesis H1 and this result is con-
sistent with submissions of Akpo, 
(2009), Bird&Zito,(2005), and Everest-
Phillip& Sandall (2009). In model 2, fi-
nancial condition and the product term 
of public governance quality and finan-
cial condition were entered and the re-
gression result reveals that financial con-
dition ( = -.401; P<.01) has negative 
relationship with tax compliance behav-
ior. The result also indicates that finan-
cial condition ( = .077; P>.10) has posi-
tive but not significance moderating ef-
fect on the relationship between public 
governance quality and tax compliance 
behavior as a result fails to support H2.  
Risk preference was included in model 3 
as a moderator (while holding financial 
condition constant) and the regression 
result shows that the relationship be-
tween risk preference and tax compli-
ance behavior ( = -.86; P<.10) is nega-
PGQ                                                                                        .326(6.277)*                 .517(9.333)*            
FinCon                                                                                                                 -.409(-7.375)* 
RP                                                                                                                          -.038(-.686) 
PGQX FinCon X RP                                                                                             -.036(-.651) 
Table 10 
Result of Multiple Regressions for the Joint Moderating Effect  of Financial  
Condition and  Risk Preference 
 Variable                                                                                    Model1                Model4
R2                                                                                                                                                 .107                                 .246
Adjusted R2                                                                                                            .104                         .237 
Change R2                                                                                           .107*                        .001 
F Value                                                                                            39.361*                   26.642*
Note: (1). *p<. .01, **p< .05,*** p< .10  (2) T Statistics in parenthesis. (3) PGQ= Public Gov-
ernance Quality, FinCon= Financial Condition, RP= Risk Preference
tive but not significant. Furthermore, the 
result also indicates that risk preference 
( = -.101; P<.10) has significant nega-
tive moderating effect on relationship 
between public governance quality and 
tax compliance behavior, therefore this 
result support H3.
Table 10 presents the results of regres-
sion on model 4 with financial condition 
and risk preference as joint moderators  
and as with other models, public govern-
ance quality is still positive related to tax 
compliance behavior significantly in the  
model 4( = .517; P<.01) . The results 
also indicate that financial condition is 
negatively related to tax compliance be-
havior significantly in the model (  = -
.409; P<.01) while risk preference  also 
to show negative but not significant rela-
tionship with tax compliance behavior 
(  = -.38; P>.10). Furthermore, table10 
also indicates that financial condition 
and risk preference have insignificant 
joint positive moderating effect (  = -
.36; P>.10) on the relationship between 
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public governance quality and tax com-
pliance behavior hence this study do not 
support H4 
5. Implications and Conclusion 
This study expanded the basic tax com-
pliance model to incorporate public gov-
ernance quality and moderating effects 
of financial condition and risk prefer-
ence. These new variables were care-
fully chosen to meet the environmental, 
situational and social reality in some 
developing countries particularly Nige-
ria. Indeed, the study has proved the 
suggestions of Alm (1999) and Jackson 
& Millron (1986)  that other factors out-
side basic model may influence tax com-
pliance behavior right. In the first place, 
the study has provided empirical support 
for the existence of strong positive rela-
tionship between public governance 
quality and taxpayers’ compliance be-
havior and furthermore that taxpayers’ 
risk preference also has significant nega-
tive moderating effect on the relation-
ship between public governance quality 
and tax compliance behavior. Although 
the moderating effect of financial condi-
tion on the relationship between the two 
variable is positive as expected but not 
significant. The same insignificant result 
was equally obtained for joint moderat-
ing effect of financial condition and risk 
preference. These findings have some 
interested theoretical and policy implica-
tions. 
 
In the first place,  the findings have 
proved that environmental, situational , 
social and cultural factors play important 
role in influencing tax compliance be-
havior not only economic factors as as-
sumed in deterrence theory. Public gov-
ernance quality plays vital role in shap-
ing compliance behavior of individual 
taxpayers, however the quality of public 
governance is below expectation in most 
developing countries including Nigeria 
(Rotberg& Gisselguist, 2009) hence 
shrinking level of compliance in these 
countries. Another distinctive contribu-
tion from this study is the transformation 
of the relationship between public gov-
ernance quality and tax compliance from 
positive to negative significantly by the 
interacting effect of risk preference. This 
result demonstrates the important mod-
erating role of taxpayer’s risk preference 
in the relationship between public gov-
ernance quality and tax compliance and 
this role cannot be underestimated theo-
retically .Moreover, this provide proof to  
researchers that  it is possible that some  
other factors may have moderating ef-
fects on the relationship between tax 
compliance and its determinants  as sug-
gested in Kirchler et al (2007). 
 
Practically, the present study suggests 
that improvement in public governance 
quality in some developing countries 
including Nigeria is the best strategy of 
reawakening the culture of tax compli-
ance among individual taxpayers. Fur-
thermore, policy makers may also be 
concerned with mapping policy to miti-
gate the negative effect of risk prefer-
ence on the relationship between public 
governance quality and tax compliance 
behavior. 
 
This study has a number of limitations. 
In the first place, the focus of this study 
was on individual taxpayers but corpo-
rate taxpayers may have different opin-
ion, perception and behavior from the 
individual taxpayers. In addition, this 
study relied on self-reported behavior of 
the taxpayers like most compliance re-
searches. The behavior that taxpayers 
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portray under this method may not be 
truth representation of their actual be-
havior (Tanzi & Shome, 1993). How-
ever, the study provides some guide for 
future research into tax compliance be-
havior. More researches are needed into 
relationship between public governance 
quality and tax compliance as well as 
moderating effect of risk preference on 
the relationship particularly in develop-
ing countries to check the consistency of 
the results produced by this study on 
these new compliance determinant and 
moderator. 
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